internetcases – Attorney Evan Brown – Page 4 – The law and emerging technologies

June 30, 2025 Artificial Intelligence, Trademarks

Court limits use of trademark for forthcoming AI-powered agentic browser

tro trademark

A technology company sued artificial intelligence company Perplexity for trademark infringement and unfair competition. Plaintiff claimed exclusive rights to the mark COMET, which it used in connection with a range of technology and consulting services. Perplexity planned to launch an “AI-powered browser for agentic search” under the same name. Plaintiff asked the court to stop Perplexity from using the mark altogether. The court granted a preliminary injunction in part, allowing the browser to launch under the COMET mark, but blocking all other uses of the mark.

To decide whether to issue the injunction, the court applied the standard four-part test. A plaintiff must show a likelihood of success on the merits, a likelihood of suffering irreparable harm without an injunction, that the balance of equities favors relief, and that the injunction is in the public interest.

The court found that plaintiff was likely to succeed on its trademark infringement claim. Plaintiff owned an incontestable federal registration for the COMET mark. That gave plaintiff a strong position on ownership. The court then looked at the likelihood of confusion between the two uses of COMET by applying the Sleekcraft factors, taken from AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1979).

On the question of similarity of the marks, the court noted the marks were identical. That factor weighed heavily in favor of plaintiff.
On the element of proximity of the competing products, the court found that even though both parties used artificial intelligence and machine learning, their overall products served different functions, had different designs, and targeted different users. That factor favored defendant.
Concerning the strength of plaintiff’s mark, plaintiff convinced the court that it had built a strong reputation over the last seven years, but the court found that plaintiff’s mark was strong only in a more limited segment of the AI space. That factor moderately favored plaintiff.
In terms of marketing channels, there was some overlap in audience. Both companies appealed to AI developers and sophisticated users, and Perplexity had the resources to dominate certain markets. That factor slightly favored plaintiff.
The degree of care exercised by customers favored defendant, since the users of both products were more likely to be careful in making their choices.
The court found that intent only slightly favored plaintiff, and that it was not a critical factor at this early stage.
On actual confusion, the evidence was sparse and open to different interpretations, so the court considered this factor neutral.
On the likelihood of expansion, the court found in favor of plaintiff. It was concerned that Perplexity, as a company “seeking to become an AI juggernaut,” would eventually expand the COMET mark into new products that could directly interfere with plaintiff’s business. The court found this concern reasonable, and Perplexity’s testimony did little to calm those concerns.

The court also found that plaintiff would suffer irreparable harm if Perplexity expanded the use of the COMET mark beyond the browser. The harm could not be undone easily, and confusion in the market could damage plaintiff’s reputation and customer relationships.

On the balance of the equities, the court found that preventing Perplexity from launching the browser would create significant hardship. However, Perplexity had repeatedly promised under oath that it had no plans to use the mark for other services. Therefore, blocking those additional uses would not harm Perplexity. On the other hand, plaintiff would be harmed if Perplexity expanded use of the mark. The court explained that a broad, mistaken injunction would be more harmful than a narrow one that was mistakenly denied.

Finally, the court found that the public interest would be served by protecting plaintiff’s narrow slice of the artificial intelligence market from confusion. Since the risk of confusion was limited to that segment, the court tailored its injunction accordingly.

The court issued an order enjoining Perplexity from using the COMET mark on any service listed in plaintiff’s trademark registration. However, Perplexity was permitted to move forward with launching its AI browser under the COMET mark.

Comet ML Inc. v. Perplexity AI, Inc., 2025 WL 1822477 N.D. Cal. (June 30, 2025)

June 26, 2025 Copyright, Litigation

Court lets authors expand copyright case to target Databricks’ new AI models

amending complaing

Five copyright holders sued Databricks and Mosaic ML, claiming their copyrighted works were used to train artificial intelligence systems without permission. Plaintiffs originally alleged that Mosaic ML directly infringed their works by training its MPT large language models on datasets that included their works. Plaintiffs also accused Databricks, Mosaic ML’s parent company, of vicarious liability for that conduct.

After Databricks released a new set of AI models called DBRX, plaintiffs moved to amend the complaint. Plaintiffs asked the court to allow a new claim of direct copyright infringement against Databricks for allegedly using the same protected works to train DBRX. Plaintiffs also sought to update the list of copyrighted works allegedly copied. Defendants opposed the request, arguing that the amendment came too late and would unfairly change the case.

Timing

The court acknowledged that plaintiffs waited more than a year after DBRX was released before requesting to amend the complaint. That delay was significant, and plaintiffs did not provide a strong explanation. However, the court noted that discovery was still open, and key deadlines had not yet passed. Because the case was still active, the court said the delay alone was not enough to deny the motion.

Intent

Defendants claimed plaintiffs acted in bad faith by dragging out the case and making vague statements in court filings. But the court saw no signs of deliberate delay or dishonesty. Instead, it found that plaintiffs’ motion to amend reflected an effort to match the complaint with new information obtained through discovery.

Prejudice

Defendants argued that allowing new claims about DBRX would cause unfair prejudice by drastically changing the case. The court disagreed. It found that the parties were already engaged in discovery related to DBRX and that any added burden would be limited. Since the DBRX and MPT models might rely on overlapping data, the new claims would not require a completely new approach to the case.

Futility

Defendants also said the new claims were too vague and would not survive a challenge. But the court said such issues should be dealt with after the complaint is amended. Unless the new claims are clearly invalid, courts usually allow amendments and address legal sufficiency later in the process.

So the court granted plaintiffs’ motion to amend. The lawsuit will now include direct copyright infringement claims against Databricks based on its newer DBRX models, along with an updated list of works that plaintiffs claims were copied.

In re Mosaic LLM Litigation, 2025 WL 1755650 (N.D. California, June 25, 2025)

June 20, 2025 Artificial Intelligence, Computer Crime, Electronic Discovery, Evidence, Privacy

Facial recognition missteps lead to dismissal in New York criminal case

facial recognition

A criminal defendant sought dismissal of a criminal charge for aggravated harassment in the second degree. An issue arose after law enforcement identified defendant using facial recognition technology operated by the FDNY, rather than approved NYPD methods. The investigation included unauthorized use of Clearview AI software and unlawful access to DMV records, which led to a digitally altered photo being included in a lineup that resulted in defendant’s identification.

Defendant asked the court to dismiss the case, arguing that the government violated its discovery obligations and denied defendant a speedy trial. Defendant claimed that critical evidence, including AI-generated facial recognition materials and records showing how the DMV photo was altered, had not been disclosed in time and that the government had failed to act with due diligence in obtaining and producing them.

The court ruled that the criminal case must be dismissed. It found that the government failed to file a valid certificate of compliance and was not ready for trial within the time limits required by New York’s speedy trial statute.

The court ruled this because the government relied on investigative tools that violated both policy and law, including the use of unauthorized AI facial recognition and improper access to protected DMV data. The government also failed to adequately pursue and disclose relevant records from FDNY and NYPD sources. The court concluded that the government’s handling of the investigation and discovery process showed a lack of reasonable diligence. The cumulative failures deprived defendant of the timely and fair process guaranteed by law.

People v. Zuhdi A., 86 Misc.3d 1227(A), 2025 WL 1790657 (Crim Ct, NY County, June 17, 2025).

April 29, 2025 Copyright, Social Media

TikTok and Meta terms granted other users remix rights

Plaintiff sued TikTok and Meta after other users on those platforms incorporated clips from her video into their own posts, allegedly without her permission. She claimed this was copyright infringement and also alleged that TikTok failed to protect her from harassment by users in the comments of her live videos. Plaintiff filed the lawsuit on her own, without a lawyer.

Plaintiff asked the court to hold TikTok and Meta liable for copyright infringement and to consider tort claims against TikTok for harassment. But both companies responded by asking the court to dismiss the case. They pointed to the user agreements Plaintiff had accepted when she signed up. Those terms gave the platforms and their users broad rights to use, modify, and distribute any content she uploaded. TikTok also invoked immunity under 47 U.S.C. 230, a provision in federal law protecting platforms from liability for user-generated content.

The court agreed with the platforms. It found that plaintiff had granted TikTok and Meta valid licenses to use her video, so there could be no copyright violation. The court also ruled that it had no authority to hear the tort claims because plaintiff had not shown that the court had jurisdiction over those parts of the case. The court rejected plaintiff’s arguments that she did not fully understand the contracts or that the agreements were unfair. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit upheld the decision, finding no clear error in how the lower court handled the case and ruling that plaintiff had waived her right to challenge the licensing issue by not objecting to it specifically.

In the end, the court dismissed all claims against both companies. The court also declined to take up any new claims plaintiff tried to raise during the appeal, saying she had not brought those up earlier and did not support them with enough detail.

Three reasons why this case matters:

It reinforces how powerful and far-reaching social media terms of service can be in protecting platforms from copyright claims.
It shows the importance of making specific objections and arguments in court—especially during appeals.
It highlights how courts apply procedural rules strictly, even when someone is representing themselves without a lawyer.

Sethunya v. TikTok, 2025 WL 1144776 (10th Cir. April 18, 2025)

March 12, 2025 First Amendment, Trademarks

Bogus trademark infringement threats violated the First Amendment

trademark registration

In 2011, two women established a public Facebook group where parents and community members could discuss matters related to the Los Lunas, New Mexico school district. This online forum served as a space for open dialogue about local education issues for seven years before drawing administrative attention.

In 2018, the district’s superintendent discovered the group and became concerned about its content. Her specific worries included posts containing incorrect snow day information and criticism directed at one of the district’s middle school principals.

The superintendent then developed a legal strategy to address the concerning online group. She filed an application with the United States Patent and Trademark Office to register the mark LOS LUNAS SCHOOLS. The USPTO granted the registration on July 9, 2019 (Reg. No. 5798193).

Equipped with purported trademark rights, the school district’s legal counsel sent cease and desist letters to the operators of the “Los Lunas School District Parent Discussion Page.” These letters threatened trademark infringement litigation if the group continued to operate under its existing name.

The Facebook group administrators sued in federal court. Their claim asserted that these trademark infringement threats constituted retaliation for speech protected by the First Amendment. When the superintendent moved for summary judgment, the district court rejected her motion, finding that the district’s actions violated the plaintiffs’ “clearly established” constitutional rights.

On appeal, the Tenth Circuit Court affirmed the lower court’s denial of summary judgment. The appellate court’s reasoning drew from principles articulated in Beedle v. Wilson, 422 F.3d 1059 (10th Cir. 2005), saying that government officials violate the First Amendment when they threaten frivolous litigation to silence protected speech.

In Beedle, the court had determined that government entities cannot bring libel actions against private citizens who criticize them -such claims are legally frivolous by definition. Similarly, in this case, the court found the trademark infringement threats to be legally baseless because the Facebook group had used the district’s name solely for commentary about the district itself, without connection to any goods or services that would trigger Lanham Act protections.

The evidence demonstrated that the district was substantially motivated to threaten litigation specifically in response to protected speech. So the case can be viewed as a warning – at least for government officials – to not misuse intellectual property law seeking to achieve an objective for which the law was not intended.

Tachias v. Sanders, — F.4th —, 2025 WL 747688 (10th Cir., March 10, 2025)

March 6, 2025 Section 230

Content moderation lapses did not make hookup app liable for misrepresentation

Section 230

App’s general statement that it would provide a “safe and secure environment” did not amount to a promise for which plaintiff could assert Barnes-style misrepresentation and thereby avoid the app’s Section 230 immunity.

Plaintiff – an underage user – sued Grindr based on injuries he suffered from meeting up with four different men with whom he had connected on the platform. One of the claims plaintiff brought was for negligent misrepresentation. Defendant stated on the app that it was “designed to create a safe and secure environment for its users,” and plaintiff alleged that defendant failed to do so.

Defendant moved to dismiss this claim under 47 U.S.C. §230, which provides that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). The district court granted the motion and plaintiff sought review with the Ninth Circuit.

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal under Section 230. In certain situations, a promise by an online platform to do something can form the basis of a claim against the platform that will not be barred by Section 230 immunity. For example, in Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2009), Section 230 did not protect Yahoo against a claim that it failed – despite its promise to do so – to take down indecent profiles impersonating the plaintiff in that case. And in Estate of Bride v. Yolo Technologies, Inc., 112 F. 4th 1168 (9th Cir. 2024), plaintiffs’ negligent misrepresentation claims were not subject to Section 230 immunity where the platform promised to unmask anonymous harassing users but failed to do so.

In this case, however, the Court saw the situation differently than it did in either Barnes or Estate of Bride. In those cases, plaintiffs were seeking to hold defendants liable for specific promises or representations. In this case, by contrast, Grindr’s general statement that its app was designed to create a safe and secure environment was a description of its moderation policy and thus protected from liability under Section 230.

Doe v. Grindr, Inc., 128 F.4th 1148 (9th Cir. February 18, 2025)

March 3, 2025 Employment

Federal court says it was OK to fire CEO who criticized boy wearing prom dress

The fired CEO of a telehealth company sued his former employer’s customer, alleging that the customer wrongfully pressured his employer to fire him after a video went viral of him confronting a boy wearing a prom dress. The lower court granted summary judgment and dismissed the plaintiff’s tortious interference claims. Plaintiff sought review with the Sixth Circuit. On appeal, the court affirmed the summary judgment in favor of the former employer’s customer.

What happened

In April 2021, plaintiff encountered teenagers taking prom photos at a Tennessee hotel. During this encounter, plaintiff told a teenage boy wearing a red prom dress that he “looked like an idiot.” Another teen recorded the interaction and posted it online, where it quickly went viral. Actress Kathy Griffin shared the video with her two million Twitter followers, identifying plaintiff.

The video created significant problems for plaintiff’s former employer. The company’s board of directors expressed concern about how plaintiff’s behavior reflected on the company.

Defendant, the former employer’s largest customer, soon received many messages expressing disappointment about its business relationship with a company whose CEO behaved this way. Defendant arranged a call with the company to discuss the situation.

According to plaintiff, defendant threatened to end its contract with the company if the company did not fire plaintiff. Shortly after this call, the company’s directors voted to terminate plaintiff’s employment. The next day, defendant publicly stated that the company “stepped up to do the right thing” by firing plaintiff.

The lawsuit

Plaintiff sued defendant (but not his former employer) for tortious interference with his employment contract and tortious interference with his employment relationship under Tennessee law. Defendant asked the court for summary judgment, arguing that plaintiff couldn’t prove his claims even if all facts were viewed in his favor.

The Court’s decision

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision to grant summary judgment to defendant, rejecting plaintiff’s claims for two main reasons.

First, plaintiff’s tortious interference with contract claim failed because the company did not breach any contract when it fired him. Plaintiff’s employment contract allowed the company to fire him with or without cause. Since the company had the legal right to terminate plaintiff’s employment, it could not have breached the contract by doing so. Under Tennessee law, a claim for tortious interference with a contract requires an actual breach of contract.

Second, plaintiff’s tortious interference with employment relationship claim failed because he could not show that defendant acted with an improper motive or used improper means. The court found no evidence that defendant acted with the primary purpose of injuring plaintiff. Instead, the record showed defendant sought to protect its business from public criticism. Additionally, defendant’s contract with the company gave it the right to stop doing business with the company “for any reason or no reason,” so, in the Court’s mind, threatening to exercise this right was not improper.

Three reasons why this case matters:

It clarifies that claims for tortious interference with contracts require an actual breach of contract, which does not occur when an employer exercises its contractual right to terminate an at-will employee.
It demonstrates that businesses can take steps to protect their reputation without facing liability for tortious interference, as long as they act within their contractual rights.
It illustrates how viral videos capturing personal conduct can have significant professional consequences, especially for people in leadership positions.

Johnson v. University Hospitals Health System, Inc., 2025 WL 637442 (6th Cir. February 27, 2025)

February 25, 2025 Contracts, Social Media

YouTube prevails in the Second Circuit over content removal breach of contract claim

Plaintiff sued defendants YouTube and Google for breach of contract, claiming that defendants violated their Terms of Service by removing and restricting plaintiff’s uploaded content without prior notice or cause. Plaintiff argued that defendants’ actions went against their agreement, which governed plaintiff’s use of the platform and the operation of plaintiff’s channels.

Defendants moved to dismiss plaintiff’s breach of contract claim, which the district court treated as a motion for summary judgment. The court granted the motion, finding that the Terms of Service clearly allowed defendants to remove content at their discretion. Plaintiff sought review with the Second Circuit. On appeal, the court affirmed the dismissal.

The appellate court noted that defendants’ Terms of Service explicitly reserved the right to take down content that violated their policies or posed potential harm. The agreement also stated that defendants would notify users after content was removed but did not require prior notice or a detailed explanation before taking action. Plaintiff received an email explaining that defendants removed content for serious or repeated violations of their Community Guidelines, which the court found sufficient under the contract’s terms.

On appeal, the pro se plaintiff did not present specific arguments against the district court’s decision. Instead, plaintiff repeated claims from the original complaint and attempted to introduce new allegations, including violations of intellectual property rights and his right to free speech. The appellate court declined to consider these new arguments because they were not part of the original case. Given the unambiguous contract terms, the court ruled that defendants had not breached the agreement and upheld the lower court’s ruling in favor of defendants.

Three reasons why this case matters:

Clarifies platform control – The ruling reinforces that social media companies have broad discretion under their Terms of Service to remove user content.
Limits user challenges – It highlights the difficulty users face when challenging content moderation decisions through breach-of-contract claims.
Confirms contract enforcement – The case affirms that courts will uphold clear contractual terms, even if users feel the enforcement is unfair.

Qian v. YouTube, LLC, 2025 WL 582785 (2d Cir. Feb. 24, 2025)

January 1, 2025 Cybersquatting, Unfair Competition

Cybersquatting claims involving unregistered trademark survive motion to dismiss

Impulse Communications sued defendants claiming unfair competition and cybersquatting. Plaintiff alleged that defendants’ use of the mark ADOPT ME! for a virtual pet game on the Roblox platform caused confusion and harmed its brand. Defendants moved to dismiss these claims. The court denied the motion.

Plaintiff’s longstanding use of its mark

Plaintiff argued that it had been using the mark ADOPT ME since 2000, investing over $200,000 to build a distinct and reputable brand. The game, originally hosted on a website, expanded into the physical toy market through partnerships and later became an iOS app. Plaintiff alleged that millions of users adopted virtual pets through the game and that the mark earned a reputation for family-friendly entertainment.

According to plaintiff, defendants launched their game ADOPT ME! in 2017 and registered domain names such as <playadopt.me>. Despite adding an exclamation mark to the branding, defendants allegedly created confusion by using names and marketing strategies that allegedly infringed on plaintiff’s mark. Plaintiff claimed this confusion damaged its reputation, especially as defendants’ game grew in popularity and entered markets such as plush toys and fast-food promotions.

Defendants’ motions

Defendants moved to dismiss plaintiff’s claims of cybersquatting and unfair competition, arguing that the mark ADOPT ME was not distinctive or famous enough for legal protection. They denied acting in bad faith when registering the disputed domain names and asserted that any similarity between the marks was unintentional. Defendants also filed a motion to strike parts of the complaint, which referenced criminal activity and speculative harms allegedly associated with defendants’ game.

The court’s decision

The court denied defendants’ motion to dismiss, ruling that plaintiff plausibly alleged distinctiveness in the mark ADOPT ME through longstanding use and national recognition. The court found sufficient allegations of consumer confusion, including misdirected communications, legal filings naming plaintiff in error, and public comments mistaking defendants’ game for plaintiff’s.

The court partially granted the motion to strike, removing allegations that were speculative or lacked a clear connection to defendants’ actions. However, the court upheld allegations related to consumer confusion and reputational harm, as they directly supported plaintiff’s claims.

Why this case matters

Consumer Confusion Risks: This case emphasizes the need for clear brand distinctions to avoid misleading customers.
Trademark Protection: It highlights the strength of common-law trademarks built on longstanding use, even without formal registration.
Digital Branding Challenges: The dispute shows the difficulties of trademark enforcement in online gaming and domain name conflicts.

Impulse Communications, Inc. v. Uplift Games, LLC, 2024 WL 5202077 (D.R.I. Dec. 23, 2024).