trademark – Page 2 – internetcases

November 14, 2022 Blockchain, Trademarks

Meta prevails in trademark infringement litigation over its logo

In the case of Dfinity Foundation v. Meta Platforms, Inc., the court considered whether the new logo that Meta adopted after its 2021 rebranding infringed upon Dfinity’s trademark. In the infringement litigation that Dfinity brought over the issue, Meta moved to dismiss. The court granted the motion.

Dfinity operates the Internet Computer – a public blockchain network that seeks to provide developers and entrepreneurs with a public compute platform for building websites, enterprise systems and internet services within an open environment. Key to Dfinity’s efforts are “dapps” or decentralized applications. In 2021, the United States Patent and Trademark Office granted Dfinity a registration for the following mark: dfinity

When Meta rebranded in 2021, Mark Zuckerberg indicated, among other things, that the company would work with creators and developers in a decentralized fashion. In connection with the rebranding, Meta adopted and sought registration of this logo: meta logo

Dfinity sued in federal court in California alleging, among other things, trademark infringement. It alleged that the similarities between the marks, coupled with the related services and customer bases, will cause confusion because “consumers will mistakenly believe that Meta and its services … are connected with, sponsored by, affiliated with, or related to Dfinity and the Internet Computer.”

Meta moved to dismiss. In granting the motion to dismiss, the court found that confusion between Meta’s logo and Dfinity’s logo was unlikely as a matter of law.

Similarity of the marks

Employing the “sight, sound, and meaning” test, the court found the marks were dissimilar: Dfinity’s shape was a traditional infinity sign, with the lines crossing at the horizontal and vertical midpoint, rendered in a precise multicolor format that Dfinity instructs users of the logo not to alter. In the court’s view, the Meta logo looks different – while it includes two loops and bears some resemblance to an infinity sign, the lines cross above the vertical midpoint and the two loops are squished into vertical oblong shapes. Meta did not claim color as a feature of its mark.

Relatedness of services

On the question of whether the services provided under the two marks were similar, the court remained neutral. It noted that Dfinity has targeted developers interested in using blockchain to “build websites, enterprise systems and internet services within an open environment.” At the same time, “Meta targets everyone, including developers, some of whom presumably are interested in building their products within, or at least compatible with, such an ‘open environment.'” Meta argued that its products are antithetical to that vision, and there is no indication that it is interested in expanding into the realm occupied by Dfinity and the Internet Computer. But the court found that given Meta’s metamorphosis over the last few years, such a move is not implausible on the pleadings, particularly in light of Zuckerberg’s statement at the launch of the Meta brand.

Sophistication of users

The court then evaluated the types of users that would encounter the Dfinity and Meta logos, and whether, given their level of sophistication, confusion would be likely. The court found that because of the high level of sophistication, it is less likely one would be confused: “That these sophisticated people, immersed in the intricacies of the tech world, would be duped by a logo, particularly one that is not similar in key respects . . . borders on implausible.”

Actual confusion

Next the court considered whether purported instances of actual confusion weighed in favor of Dfinity. In this situation, Dfinity had provided six tweets that purported to show that users were confused. But the court disagreed. First, it noted that because the tweets were in reply to a Dfinity tweet, they did not express how the users would experience an encounter with the mark “organically”. And second, the court found that the content of the tweets indicated the users actually knew the difference between the two enterprises.

Marketing channels

Having found that the parties’ services were not “totally unrelated” at this stage, the court also found that the parties’ marketing channels were similar, but that this factor did not weigh as heavily as the others previously discussed.

Meta’s intent

Though Dfinity alleged “willful and wonton disregard of Dfinity’s established and superior rights” in its trademark, it did not provide evidence of that. And given that the court found the marks to be dissimilar, the court also found that Meta’s intent did not support a finding of likelihood of confusion.

Dfinity Foundation v. Meta Platforms, Inc., 2022 WL 16857036 (N.D. California, November 10, 2022)

March 31, 2020 Podcasts, Trademarks

Video: 3 trademark essentials for your business

Here are three key ideas for selecting and protecting your company’s trademark:

(1) choose a distinctive mark that is not descriptive,

(2) conduct clearance so that you will not infringe, and

(3) seek registration with the United States Patent and Trademark Office.

October 21, 2019 Trademarks

Cost of domain name was relevant in establishing secondary meaning of trademark

In a trademark dispute between two companies in the real estate space, the court was called upon – at the summary judgment stage – to determine if there was a triable issue as to whether plaintiff’s STOCKDALE mark was not merely descriptive but instead had acquired distinctiveness.

Defendants had argued that plaintiff’s case failed because plaintiff did not have a protectable mark. Plaintiff countered that its STOCKDALE mark, which it had used for 30 years and which the court found was primarily merely a surname, had acquired distinctiveness. Guided by the principles in the case of Viacom Int’l v. IJR Capital Investments, LLC, 891 F.3d 178 (5th Cir. 2018) (the Krusty Krab case), the court examined, concerning plaintiff’s mark:

length and manner of use of the mark or trade dress,
volume of sales,
amount and manner of advertising,
nature of use of the mark or trade dress in newspapers and magazines,
consumer-survey evidence,
direct consumer testimony, and
the defendant’s intent in copying the [mark].

It determined that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the mark was protectable as one that had acquired distinctiveness. Interestingly, the plaintiff had not kept track of its advertising expenditures, but did introduce evidence that it had paid more than $50,000 to acquire the domain name stockdale(.)com. The court found that information relevant to inquiry.

Stockdale Investment Group, Inc. v. Stockdale Capital Partners, LLC, No. 18-2949, 2019 WL 5191526 (S.D. Tex., October 15, 2019)

About the Author: Evan Brown is a Chicago technology and intellectual property attorney. Call Evan at (630) 362-7237, send email to ebrown [at] internetcases.com, or follow him on Twitter @internetcases. Read Evan’s other blog, UDRP Tracker, for information about domain name disputes.

October 11, 2019 Cybersquatting, Trademarks

Yahoo successor does not prevail in bid to obtain ymobile.com domain

Oath, Inc., the successor to Yahoo! Inc., filed an action under the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP) against a domainer that acquired ymobile.com earlier in 2019. The split 3-member FORUM panel denied the complaint, finding that Oath failed to demonstrate that the respondent lacked rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name, and failed to show it registered and used the disputed domain name in bad faith.

On the question of rights or legitimate interests, the panel found that the respondent’s purchase and sale of the domain name comprised of the generic term “mobile” prefixed by “y” was legitimate, so long as the respondent did not intend to capitalize on Oath’s YMOBILE mark, which is registered in Japan. The panel accepted the respondent’s assertion that it had no notice of the YMOBILE mark prior to acquiring the disputed domain name.

Regarding bad faith registration and use, the panel similarly found that the respondent was not targeting the Y! or YMOBILE mark, and that it had no knowledge of the YMOBILE mark’s existence prior to acquiring the disputed domain name.

One of the panelists dissented, arguing that the disputed domain name should have been transferred. He emphasized how the respondent was using the disputed domain name – which the panel found was identical to a mark the complainant owns – to display pay-per-click ads for goods and services competitive with the complainant’s. Some of the ads, for example, were for online games and downloadable software. And on the issue of bad faith, this panel member observed that although the respondent claimed to not know of the complainant’s YMOBILE mark, a simple web search would have revealed it.

Oath Inc. v. Mira Hold, No. FA 1909001858330 (Forum, October 8, 2019)

December 13, 2018 Defamation, First Amendment, Trademarks

Restraining order entered against website that encouraged contacting children of plaintiff’s employees

Plaintiff sued defendant (who was an unhappy customer of plaintiff) under the Lanham Act (for trademark infringement) and for defamation. Defendant had registered a domain name using plaintiff’s company name and had set up a website that, among other things, he used to impersonate plaintiff’s employees and provide information about employees’ family members, some of whom were minors.

Plaintiff moved for a temporary restraining order and the court granted the motion.

The Website

The website was structured and designed in a way that made it appear as though it was affiliated with plaintiff. For example, it included a copyright notice identifying plaintiff as the owner. It also included allegedly false statements about plaintiff. For example, it included the following quotation, which was attributed to plaintiff’s CEO:

Well of course we engage in bad faith tactics like delaying and denying our policy holders [sic] valid claims. How do you think me [sic], my key executive officers, and my board members stay so damn rich. [sic]

The court found that plaintiff had shown a likelihood of success on the merits of its claims.

Lanham Act Claim

It found that defendant used plaintiff’s marks for the purpose of confusing the public by creating a website that looked as though it was a part of plaintiff’s business operations. This was evidenced by, for example, the inclusion of a copyright notice on the website.

Defamation

On the defamation claim, the court found that the nature of the statements about plaintiff, plaintiff’s assertion that they were false, and the allegation that the statements were posted on the internet sufficed to satisfy the first two elements of a defamation claim, namely, that they were false and defamatory statements pertaining to the plaintiff and were unprivileged publications to a third party. The allegations in the complaint were also sufficient to indicate that defendant “negligently disregarded the falsity of the statements.”

Furthermore, the statements on the website concerned the way that plaintiff processed its insurance claims, which related to the business of the company and the profession of plaintiff’s employees who handled the processing of claims. Therefore, the final element was also satisfied.

First Amendment Limitations

The court’s limitation in the TRO is interesting to note. To the extent that plaintiff sought injunctive relief directed at defendant’s speech encouraging others to contact the company and its employees with complaints about the business, whether at the workplace or at home, or at public “ad hominem” comments, the court would not grant the emergency relief that was sought.

The court also would not prohibit defendant from publishing allegations that plaintiff had engaged in fraudulent or improper business practices, or from publishing the personally identifying information of plaintiff’s employees, officers, agents, and directors. Plaintiff’s submission failed to demonstrate to the court’s satisfaction how such injunctive relief would not unlawfully impair defendant’s First Amendment rights.

The did, however, enjoin defendant from encouraging others to contact the children and other family members of employees about plaintiff’s business practices because contact of that nature had the potential to cause irreparable emotional harm to those family members, who have no employment or professional relationship with defendant.

Symetra Life Ins. Co. v. Emerson, 2018 WL 6338723(D. Maine, Dec. 4, 2018)

November 26, 2018 Anonymity, Litigation, Trademarks

Anonymous online trademark infringer can be identified through subpoena to domain registrar

Plaintiff trademark owner noticed that an unknown party was using plaintiff’s mark to sell email templates online without plaintiff’s authorization. After the unknown infringer’s domain name registrar (the case does not say whether it was also the web host) refused to take down the allegedly infringing content, plaintiff filed suit against the “John Doe” defendant. Since it needed to learn the identity of the defendant to move the case forward, plaintiff asked the court for early discovery that would permit plaintiff to send a subpoena to the registrar that would compel the registrar to identify its customer.

The court granted the motion for leave to take early discovery. It applied the standard set out in OpenMind Solutions, Inc. v. Does 1-39, 2011 WL 4715200 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2011) (citing Columbia Ins. Co. v. seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 578-80 (N.D. Cal. 1999)), which requires that prior to early discovery being permitted, a plaintiff must show:

Plaintiff can identify the missing party with sufficient specificity such that the court can determine that defendant is a real person or entity who could be sued in federal court;
Plaintiff has identified all previous steps taken to locate the elusive defendant;
Plaintiff’s suit against defendant could withstand a motion to dismiss; and
Plaintiff has demonstrated that there is a reasonable likelihood of being able to identify defendant through discovery such that service of process would be possible.

On the first factor, plaintiff had alleged that the Doe defendant owned or was using the specified domain name associated with the offending website to sell email templates using plaintiff’s trademark.

As for the second factor, plaintiff had contacted the domain name registrar, and asked that the information be taken down, but the registrar refused to do so. The domain name alone was not sufficient for plaintiff to identify the Doe defendant, and plaintiff had no other means to identify the Doe defendant besides the registrar’s record which it refused to provide without a subpoena.

Regarding the third factor, plaintiff made the required showing by alleging that it holds a valid trademark for its mark that the Doe defendant used to sell products on the offending website.

And concerning the fourth factor, the plaintiff had alleged that the registrar was the registrar for the domain name associated with the offending website and that it had stated it would pass the complaint information on to the website owner. The court found that plaintiff had thus demonstrated that a subpoena to the registrar should reveal the identity of the Doe defendant.

One should note this court’s willingness to permit early discovery as being in contrast to another court’s recent apparent disdain for a copyright troll plaintiff seeking the identity of an anonymous online infringer.

Marketo, Inc. v. Doe, 2018 WL 6046464 (N.D.Cal. Nov. 19, 2018)

October 23, 2017 Cybersquatting, Litigation, Trademarks

Court orders transfer of domain name at preliminary injunction stage of trademark case

Plaintiff sued a competitor under the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (15 U.S.C. 1125(d) (“ACPA”)) and brought other trademark-related claims concerning the competitor’s alleged online scam of selling infringing nutritional supplement products. Plaintiff also sued the domain name privacy protection service Namecheap, which the competitor had used to register the domain name. As part of the order granting plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction, the court ordered Namecheap to transfer the domain name to plaintiff.

The court noted that a preliminary injunction “is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right,” and that the “traditional purpose of a preliminary injunction is to protect the status quo and to prevent irreparable harm during the pendency of the lawsuit.” Given these parameters, one may be reasonably surprised that the court went so far as to transfer the domain name before the case could be taken all the way through trial. Usually the transfer of the domain name is part of the final remedy awarded in a cybersquatting case, whether under the ACPA or the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy.

The opinion did not address the issue of whether the domain name transfer prior to trial might go further than to “protect the status quo”. It would seem the court could have just as easily protected the status quo by ordering the domain name not be used. The court apparently found the evidence to be drastically in favor of plaintiff. And since the defendant-competitor did not show up for the hearing, plaintiff’s evidence went unrebutted.

Nutramax Laboratories, Inc. v. Nutra Max Labs, Inc., 2017 WL 4707447 (D.S.C. October 20, 2017)

UDRP complainant denied relief where disputed domain name also contained competitor’s trademark

A National Arbitration Forum panel denied relief to industrial manufacturer NSK (owner of the same mark) in a dispute over the domain name <skfnsk.com>. The panel found that the complainant did not meet the first element under the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP) – the disputed domain name was not confusingly similar to the complainant’s NSK mark..

The case serves as an example of a panel departing from the ordinary determination that a disputed domain name incorporating the complainant’s mark as a whole will suffice to demonstrate confusing similarity.

The distinguishing fact in this case was that the other portion of the mark (SKF) is the trademark of one of the complainant’s competitors. The panel cited two other cases where complainants were denied relief in UDRP actions over disputed domain names containing both the complainant’s mark and that of another company. In NIKE, Inc. and Nike Innovate, C.V. v. Mattia Lumini and Yykk Snc, NAF Case No. FA1679233 (July 15, 2016), the panel denied relief to Nike over the disputed domain name <nikegoogle.com>. Similarly, in Dell Inc. v. Ionel Adrian Nicolae, NAF Case No. FA1683104 (August 22, 2016) the panel held that “Nvidia Corp. has not been joined as a Complainant in this matter and there is no nexus available through which Complainant can claim to have rights to the transfer of the <alienware-nvidia.xyz>”

NSK LTD. v. Li shuo, NAF Case No. 1683104 (February 16, 2017)

This post also appeared on UDRP Tracker.

October 28, 2016 Cybersquatting, Trademarks

Court keeps door open on cabinet retailer’s domain name lawsuit

acpa

A guy named Plaza worked for defendant cabinet retailer for a few years and then left to start a competing business called 411 Kitchen Cabinets. Defendant seems to have not liked the new competition and registered the domain name <411kitchencabinet.com>. This allegedly caused confusion among consumers and negatively impacted the new business.

So the new company sued in federal court alleging claims under the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection (15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)) (“ACPA”) and for trademark dilution. Defendant moved to dismiss. The court dismissed the dilution claim but allowed the ACPA claim to move forward.

Not like “Budweiser, Camel and Barbie”

To properly plead dilution, plaintiff was required to allege, among other things, that its mark was “famous”. Under the federal trademark law – the Lanham Act – a mark is “famous” when “it is widely recognized by the general consuming public of the United States as a designation of source of the goods or services of the mark’s owner.” 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A).

The court found that plaintiff had not alleged enough facts to show fame. In the court’s view, at most, plaintiff had alleged that its mark “ha[d] enjoyed a good name and reputation in the cabinets, countertops, vanities and granite industry.” That allegation did not establish the requisite fame required for a dilution claim and fell “well-short of alleging that Plaintiff’s mark [was] on the same scale as marks like Budweiser, Camel, and Barbie,” citing Brain Pharma, LLC v. Scalini, 858 F. Supp. 2d 1349, 1357 (S.D. Fla. 2012)

Yes on the cybersquatting claim

But the ACPA claim fared better. The court found plaintiff’s complaint sufficient to allege that plaintiff had sufficiently alleged that its use of its mark in commerce prior to the registration of the disputed domain name made the mark distinctive and entitled to protection. It also successfully pled that defendant’s domain name was confusingly similar to plaintiff’s mark. And the court also found that plaintiff successfully alleged that defendant had a bad faith to intent in registering and using the domain name. Key to this last portion was the fact that plaintiff alleged that defendant used the domain name to divert customers to its main website for commercial gain.

411 Kitchen Cabinets LLC v. King of Kitchen and Granite Inc., 2016 WL 7335840 (S.D. Fla. October 25, 2016)

See also:

January 5, 2015 Cybersquatting, Trademarks

Domain name case under ACPA failed because trademark was not distinctive

Federal appeals court holds that plaintiff failed to satisfy all elements of the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act in action against competing airline

The federal Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA) [15 U.S.C. 1125(d)] is a provision in U.S. law that gives trademark owners a cause of action against one who has wrongfully registered a domain name. In general, the ACPA gives rights to owners of trademarks that are either distinctive or famous at the time the defendant registered the offending domain name.

The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals recently affirmed the decision of a lower court that dismissed an ACPA claim, holding that the plaintiff failed to plead that its mark was distinctive at the time of the domain name registration.

Plaintiff sued its competitor, who registered the domain name tropicoceanairways.com. Defendant moved to dismiss, and the lower court granted the motion, finding that plaintiff failed to plead that its mark TROPIC OCEAN AIRWAYS was distinctive and thus protected under the ACPA. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal, holding that plaintiff’s complaint failed to allege that the mark was either suggestive or had acquired secondary meaning as an indicator of source for plaintiff’s services.

Suggestive marks are considered distinctive because they require “a leap of the imagination to get from the mark to the product.” (The court provided the example of a penguin used as a mark for refrigerators.) In this case, the court found the term “tropic ocean airways” was not suggestive, as it merely “inform[ed] consumers about the service [plaintiff provided]: flying planes across the ocean to tropical locations.”

The court rejected plaintiff’s argument that a pending application at the United States Patent and Trademark Office to register the mark proved that it was suggestive. While a certificate of registration may establish a rebuttable presumption that a mark is distinctive, the court held plaintiff was not entitled to such a presumption here, where the application remained pending. Moreover, the court observed in a footnote that the presumption of distinctiveness will generally only go back to the date the application was filed. In this case, the trademark application was not filed until about a year after the domain name was registered.

As for the argument the mark had acquired secondary meaning, the court found plaintiff’s allegations to be insufficient. The complaint instead made conclusory allegations about secondary meaning that were insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. The court held that plaintiff failed to allege the nature and extent of its advertising and promotion, and, more importantly, did not allege any facts about the extent to which the public identified the mark with plaintiff’s services.

Tropic Ocean Airways, Inc. v. Floyd, — Fed.Appx. —, 2014 WL 7373625 (11th Cir., Dec. 30, 2014)

Evan Brown is an attorney in Chicago helping clients with domain name, trademark, and other matters involving technology and intellectual property.